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mAbstract
Purpose: In the context of modernization and development, a complex adaptive
systems framework can help address the coupling of macro social constraint and
opportunity with individual agency. Combining system dynamics and agent based
modeling, we formalize a simulation approach of the Human Development (HD)
perspective to explore the interactive effects of economics, culture, society and
politics across multiple human scales.
Methods: Based on a system of asymmetric, coupled nonlinear equations, we first
capture the core qualitative logic of HD theory, empirically validated from World
Values Survey (WVS) data. Using a simple evolutionary game approach, second we
fuse endogenously derived individual socio-economic attribute changes with
Prisoner’s Dilemma in an agent based model of the interactive political-cultural
effects of heterogeneous, spatial intra-societal economic transactions. We then
explore a new human development dynamics (HDD) model behavior via quasi-
global simulation methods to identify paths and pitfalls towards economic
development, cultural plasticity, social and political change behavior.
Results: Our preliminary results suggest strong nonlinear path dependence and
complexity in three areas: adaptive development processes, co-evolutionary societal
transactions and near equilibrium development trajectories, with significant
implications for anticipating and managing positive development outcomes. Strong
local epistatic interactions characterized by adaptive co-evolution, shape higher order
global conditions and ultimately societal outcomes.
Conclusions: Techno-social simulations such as this can provide scholars and
policymakers alike insights into the nonlinear, complex adaptive effects of societal
co-evolution. We believe complex adaptive or evolutionary systems approaches are
necessary to understand both near and potentially catastrophic, far-from-equilibrium
behavior and societal outcomes across all human scales of modernization.
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Since the turn of the 20th century, social scientists have identified dynamic linkages be-
tween economic development, cultural change, and political development with popu-
larized arguments for and against modernization (Huntington 1996; Chua 2003; Sachs
2005). However, recent international events amplify the dynamism of social forces.
Revolutions, international terrorism with economic development (Barnett 2004),
instability via globalization (Rodrik 1998), modernization’s “clash of civilizations”
(Huntington 1996), the interlocks between politics and economics (Acemoglu and
Robinson 2012) and the interdisciplinary Human Development (HD) perspective
(Inglehart and Welzel 2005) are but some examples. Across all, positive feedback
mechanisms shift seemingly stable system phenomena towards complexity and cata-
strophic, far-from-equilibria conditions (Thom 1977; Cambel 1993; Arthur 1994a, b;).
Such events force our current scientific understanding to change perhaps radically,
considering new possibilities and outcomes that integrate explanations across previ-
ously disparate fields.
Rooted in comparative political economy, the HD perspective is a qualitative,
trans-disciplinary approach to understanding modernization and development
through the lens of interdependent economic, cultural, social and political forces at
multiple scales, from individuals to institutions and society as a whole. Here we ex-
tend previous work by Abdollahian et al.’s (2012) novel, quantitative systems dynamic
representation of HD theory at the societal level towards integrated macro–micro
scales in an agent based framework. As macroscopic structures emerging from
microscopic events lead to entrainment and modification of both, co-evolutionary
processes are created over time (Prigogine and Stengers 1984). Quek et al. (2009)
also design an interactive macro–micro agent based framework, which they call a
spatial Evolutionary Multi-Agent Social Network (EMAS), on the dynamics of civil
violence. We posit a new, Human Development Dynamics (HDD) approach where
agency matters: individual game interactions, strategy decisions and outcome histor-
ies determine an individual’s experience. These decisions are constrained or incentiv-
ized by the changing macro economic, cultural, social and political environment via
HD theory, conditioned on individual attributes at any particular time. Emergent be-
havior results from individuals’ current feasible choice set, conditioned upon past be-
havior and macro outcomes. Conversely, progress on economic development, the
formation of cultural mores, societal norms and democratic preferences emerge from
individuals’ behavior interactions.
In order to create a robust techno-social simulation (Vespignani 2009) platform, first
we instantiate a system of asymmetric, coupled nonlinear difference equations that cap-
ture the core logic of HD macro-social theory. These are then empirically validated
with five waves of data from the World Values Survey (2009). Similar to Quek et al.
(2009), second we then fuse HD endogenous systems to agent attribute changes with a
generalizable, non-cooperative Prisoner’s Dilemma game following Axelrod (1987,
1997a, b), Nowak and Sigmund (1993, 1998, and Osterkamp (1997) to simulate intra-
societal, spatial economic transactions. Understanding the interactive political-cultural
effects of macro-socio dynamics and individual agency in intra-societal transactions are
key elements of a complex adaptive systems approach. Finally, we explore the model’s
behavioral dynamics via simulation methods to identify paths and pitfalls towards
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across different stages of development. We find strong epistatic interactions, where
strategies are interdependent, and local social co-evolution (Kauffman 1993), help de-
termine global-macro development outcomes in a particular society.HD dynamics background
HD postulates a modernization process that is neither inevitable nor unidirectional.
Following Maslow’s (1954) hierarchy of needs, individual value orientations drive an in-
dividual’s level of existential security and change in predictable ways given shifts in ex-
istential security. These value orientations are shaped by economic development and
societal wealth. HD theory provides a framework in which economic development in-
teracts with basic human needs and facilitates generalizable shifts in cultural predispo-
sitions and potentially revolutionary political behavior (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and
Baker 2000; Welzel et al. 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Robust empirics support
that individual value orientation are represented by two primary dimensions— rational-
secular and self-expression value orientations (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Baker
2000; Welzel et al. 2003; Norris and Inglehart 2004; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Both
are strongly influenced by economic progress and are more prevalent at different stages
of development. HD theory naturally lends itself to a complex adaptive systems ap-
proach given the theoretical entrainment of macroscopic structures and microscopic
individual agency, with individual value orientations shaped by and impacting macro
societal outcomes.
While not a strict, formal economic growth model, HD theory leverages off growth
theory. Neoclassical growth models (Solow 1956; Swan 1956; Barro 1991) specify three
key economic drivers as the engine of growth: increasing capital relative to labor, higher
rate of returns for underdeveloped societies and finally diminishing returns to capital.
Together these factors propel middle income societies on high growth paths towards
convergence and steady state equilibrium − measured as sigma convergence which is
the reduction in income dispersion levels across economies and beta convergence when
developing societies growth rates slow down as they become developed (Mankiw et al.
1992; Sala-i-Martin 1996). Such approaches specify detailed and interactive vectors of
economic determinants, with country and time specific effects separate and in a more
auxiliary manner (Caselli et al. 1996). Dissatisfied with a theoretically exogenous and
ad hoc role of technology decoupled from economic factors, endogenous growth
scholars (Romer 1986; Lucas 1988) explicitly link technology and human capital’s ef-
fects to productivity. One major finding is that increasing rates of return to human cap-
ital do not produce steady state outcomes nor convergence. This allows highly
developed societies to continue growing.
Similar to the endogenous growth literature, HD theory expands the breadth of de-
velopment processes to include cultural, social and political effects to account for
modernization across all scales. First, rational-secular values correspond to individuals’
growing emphasis on technical, mechanical, rational, and bureaucratic views of the
world. During economic industrialization phases, cultural dispositions tend to progress
from an emphasis on traditional pre-industrial values—often measured in terms of reli-
gious ceremony attendance and the importance of religion in an individual’s life—to
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logical progress and bureaucratic political life.
The second dimension, self-expression, corresponds to the post-industrial phase of
economic development where economic progress and an advanced welfare system pro-
vide many individuals in with an overwhelming sense of existential security (Bell 1973).
As economic activity changes from primary, to secondary and tertiary sectors, individ-
uals no longer work on farms, but in factories, while some pursue careers in the service
industry. The reduction in human constraint—via increased productivity and wealth,
advances in education, and service related economic activities—brings about a new
sense of autonomy. Because the primary focus is no longer on survival, individuals are
free to emphasize a general need for self-expression, question authority, and demand
political participation. Rising self-expression values lead to the emergence of effective
political institutions (Welzel et al. 2003). Mass tendencies toward self-expression facili-
tate a political climate conducive to potentially elite-challenging activity and a civic cul-
ture consistent with genuine democratic governance.
Self-expression values promote liberal political institutions through two mechanisms.
First, to the extent that there is incongruence between cultural demand for, and polit-
ical supply of liberal institutions, individuals are more or less prone to elite-challenging
activity (Gurr 1970; Eckstein and Gurr 1975). Second, self-expression values support
the social acceptance of basic democratic norms such as trust and political participa-
tion. The end result is a gradual transition toward democratization in autocratic na-
tions and more effective political representation in democratic nations (Inglehart and
Welzel 2005). Lastly, based on work on liberal institutions and economic development
(Diamond 1992; Boix 2003; Feng 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012) HD theory ex-
pects positive feedbacks between democratic institutions and economic progress. De-
clining economic conditions reintroduce the primacy of basic economic needs, fueling
the structural conditions for more traditional value orientations, reducing society’s
ability to seek self-actualization, and increasing the likelihood of political change. Dis-
equilibrium between culturally defined political expectations and political rights or
civil liberty realities promotes elite challenging activity and provides motivation for
revolutionary change. Equations 1 through 4 below transform HD’s qualitative theor-
etical specification into a nonlinear, first order interdependent system (Abdollahian
et al. 2012).
dY
dt
¼ λ1 1−Yð Þ þ λ2D ð1Þ
dRS
dt
¼ α1Y−α2 RS−Yð Þ½ RS 1−RSð Þ ð2Þ
dSE
dt
¼ β1YSE 1−SEð Þ ð3Þ
dD
dt
¼ γ1SE SE−Dð Þ þ γ2D½  1−Dð Þ ð4Þ
Y economic progress
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SE self-expression values
D effective democracy
α1 maps the interactive effects of Y and RS onto growth in level of RS
α2 regulates the dynamic effects of economic incongruence
β1 maps the interactive effects of Y and SE onto growth in the level of SE
γ1 regulates the dynamic effects of political incongruence
γ2 maps past governance structure onto the growth in effective democracy
λ1 parameter for economic progress
λ2 parameter of the democratic impact on economic development
Figure 1 above identifies four macro HD system phase portraits (Abdollahian et al.
2012) under equilibrium conditions. The HD perspective suggests a staged process in
which rising level of existential security via economic development leads to an in-
creased emphasis on rational-secular and self-expression values. Specifically, individuals
tend to emphasize rational-secular values during the industrialization phase of develop-
ment and self-expression values during the post-industrial phase. Second, the rise in
self-expression values strengthens democratic norms and promotes effective democ-
racy, implying a positive relationship between self-expression and liberal political insti-
tutions. However, these effects are neither linear nor monotonic as we see strong
reversion towards autocratic institutional preferences in low self-expressive, survivalFigure 1 HD Phase portraits (Abdollahian et al. 2012).
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sive values. Democratic norms and institutions that outpace economic progress are in-
herently unstable with a persistent, turbulent reversion processes. This can occur even
at high levels of democratic norms and existential security. This suggests societies ex-
periencing democratization can frequently expect punctuated reversals and revolutions
towards more autocratic institutions until more sustainable economic growth and
democratic institutions re-emerge.
Methods
While innovative and the first to formalize a systems approach for HD theory, a limita-
tion of Abdollahian et al’s (2012) work lacks, coupling and interdependence across
human scales, from individuals to institutions and finally the societal outcomes they
generate. Our HDD model uniquely combines the interactive effects and feedbacks
between individual human agency as well as the macro environmental constraints and
opportunities that change over time for any given society. Decisions by individuals are
affected by other individuals, social context, and system states. These decisions have
variegated first and second order effects, given any particular system state or individual
attributes. Such an approach attempts to increase both theoretical and empirical veri-
similitude for some key elements of complexity processes − emergence, connectivity,
interdependence and feedback (Miller and Page 2007) − found throughout several dis-
ciplines across all scales of modernization and human development.
Implemented in NetLogo (Wilensky 1999), Figure 2 depicts the high level process
and multi-module architecture. We maintain individual agent attribute relationships
and postulated changes of RS, SE, D and Y following HD theory. These endogenously
derived, individual agent attributes (RSi, SEi, Di and Yi) impact how economicFigure 2 HDD architecture.
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creasing scales, ultimately societal productivity (Binmore 1998). Thus we create the tes-
sellated pattern of heterogeneously mixed populations that cooperate and compete in a
changing political economy backdrop to model social co-evolutionary processes
Capturing individual agent endogenous processes, we first transform Abdollahian
et al.’s system of equations from differential to discrete equations for NetLogo tractabil-
ity and use their empirically validated parameter values as a good first approximation.
Given individual citizen attributes and HD processes at each iteration, we sum up each
agent attributes across Y, RS, SE and D to find resulting societal distributions for each
variable, yet are mindful of ecological correlation. This allows us to explore the inter-
active effects of income inequality, cultural schisms, social complexity or highly polar-
ized political dialogues in any given society as the emergence of individual efforts and
patterns of interactions.
Evolutionary game theory provides insights to understanding individual, repeated so-
cietal transactions in heterogeneous populations (Fudenberg and Maskin 1986;
Sigmund 1993; Maynard-Smith and Szathmary 1995). Social co-evolutionary systems
allow each individual to either influence or be influenced by all other individuals as
well as macro society (Snijders et al. 2007; Zheleva et al. 2009), perhaps eventually be-
coming coupled and quasi-path interdependent. In our case, we do not have well
mixed populations, but explicit spatial contact networks given population density,
technology diffusion and agent attributes. Thus we explicitly recognize that the differ-
ential impact of heterogeneous, spatial structures matters (Santos et al. 2006). This
captures various individual preferences and their socioeconomic attributes. Accord-
ingly, we instantiate a non-cooperative, socio-economic Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
transaction game given agent i’s attribute vector (Ai) of social, cultural, political and
economic preference (RSi, SEi, Di and Yi) similarity to agent j (Aj) for any Aij pairs. The
motivation behind this is that individuals are more likely to interact, engage and con-
duct transactions with other agents of similar religious, secular and expressive norms
(Schelling 1971) and produce different co-evolutionary behavior via frequency and rate
dynamics (McKelvey 1999).
At each iteration t, we first randomly choose 50% of spatially proximal agents as
sources who can select a partner. The remaining targets are chosen by other agents
based on symmetric preference rankings and asymmetric neighborhood proximity dis-
tributions. Here we look at communications reach, social connectivity and technology
diffusion as constraining the potential set of Aij game pairs, called talk span. Low values
constrain games to local neighborhoods among spatially proximate agents, while higher
values expand potential Aij pairs globally, modeling socially compressed space.
Social Judgment Theory (Darity 2008; Griffin 2009) describes how the positions of
two agents can be conceived along a Downsian continuum while distance between
these positions affects the likelihood of one accepting the other’s position. Agent i eval-
uates the likelihood of conducting a simple socio-economic transaction with agent j
based on similarity of socio-cultural preferences |RSi-RSj| and |SEi-SEj| within a given
local neighborhood. This captures communications and technology diffusion for fre-
quency and social tie formation (McPherson et al. 2001). This also reflects recent work
on the importance of both dynamic strategies and updating rules based on agent attri-
butes affecting co-evolution (Kauffman 1993; Moyano and Sanchez 2008). Source
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agents within a given neighborhood radius. Shorter preference distances increase the
probability that Aij will enter into a socio-economic transaction and play the PD game.
After each source agent calculates its probability of playing a game with all possible
target agents, it chooses the target with the highest probability as its partner. Target
agents also repeat the same process symmetrically. We then choose the Aij pairing
with the highest probability derived from its preference-proximity function at a
particular iteration.
After agents decide to play at each t, each select strategies probabilistically based on
similarity of political preferences as expressed by |Di-Dj|. Siero and Doosje (1993)
among others show that messages close to a receiver’s position has little effect, while
those far from a receiver’s position is likely to be rejected, capturing the notions of bi-
partisanship or conversely hyper-partisanship. So when D distance is short, there is a
higher probability of cooperating while larger distances results in a higher probability
of defecting. Relative payoffs for each agent are based on simple PD, non-cooperative
game theory (Nowak and Sigmund 1993; Fehr and Fischbacher 2004; Dixit et al. 2009)
where T > R > P > S, with T= 2, R=1, P = 0 and S= −1. When both agents cooperate,
each agent receives a payoff of T. When one plays cooperate but the other plays defect,
the cooperating agent loses with payoff S while the defecting agent gains with payoff T.
When both play defect, neither gain from the transaction, and each agent receives a
payoff of P.
Following Nowak and Sigmund (1993), we randomly assign game transaction values.
However we do not asymmetrically constrain such values, instead allowing any particu-
lar game transaction value between pairs, Vij, to lie in between [−.1, .1], randomly dis-
tributed. This instantiation allows for different potential deal sizes, costs, benefits, or
synergies for any agent to gain or lose. We specifically model socio-economic transac-
tion games as producing either positive or negative values as we want to capture behav-
ioral outcomes from games with both upside gains or downside losses. Subsequently,
Aij games’ Vij outcomes condition agent Eit+1 values, modeling realized costs or benefits
from any particular interaction. The updated Eit+1 = E
i
t + A
ij game payoff for each agent
then gets added to the individual’s attributes for the next iteration. We then repeat in-
dividual endogenous processing, aggregated up to society as a whole and repeat the
game processes for t+n iterations, where n is the last iteration.
In our HDD framework, Ai strategies are adaptive, which affect Aij pairs locally
within a proximate radius as first order effects. Other agents, within the system but
outside the talkspan radius, are impacted through cascading higher orders. In HDD,
we explicitly model epistatic interactions (Kauffman 1993) to capture co-evolutionary
behavior in a simple, yet elegant manner. Although easily done, we specifically do not
model mathematically complex, individual agent memory or learning from Vij out-
comes as many others do (Axelrod 1987; Sigmund and Nowak 1999). However, mem-
ory and history still matter. The sum of all prior individual behavioral histories,
evolutionary through iterations, does contribute to each individual and societal
current states. As an initial effort at a scale integrated framework, this frees us to focus
on the coupling of structure and agency first, before enriching subcomponent process
detail. Thus agents simultaneously co-evolve as strategy pair outcomes CC, DC/CD or
DD at t to increase Yi at t+1, thus driving both positive and negative RS, SE and D
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tion to a changing environment, summing Yi, RSi, SEi and Di vector values. Feedback
into subsequent Aij game selection networks and strategy choice yields a complex
adaptive system representation across multiple scales. The accompanying pseudo code
is shown below.Results
We use Abdollahian et al’s parameter estimates from their genetic algorithm non-linear
least squares (GANLS) estimation procedure on WVS data to populate system coeffi-
cients to increase model validity. The data spans from 1981 to 2007 from five waves for
over 45 countries. The GANLS three step approach (Coan 2011) first employs a genetic
algorithm to search global parameter space, a simplex algorithm to search local param-
eters space, and finally a bootstrapping procedure to derive the uncertainty associated
with the parameter estimates. Given empirical β coefficient estimates for the HD sys-
tem, we then conduct a quasi-global sensitivity analysis on the entire HDD agent based
model input and initial condition parameters for 700 time steps using pooled OLS re-
gression. Here we approximate one time step as one month given past data calibration
(Abdollahian et al. 2012) for a simulated time span of almost 60 years. We performed
over 40,000 runs given various input parameter combinations for a low resolution, ini-
tial sensitivity approximation.
Figure 3 depicts our HDD interface and a single sample run. The interface shows
physical output space—heterogeneously mixed agents distributed spatially, where agent
size indicates individual economic wealth Y, agent color represents democratic prefer-
ence D, ranging from fully autocratic in red to fully democratic in blue. Aij game trans-
actions Vij are shown as links at each t. For all agents’ Y, RS, SE, D attributes, we setup
the following initial conditions: societal mean Y ; RS; SE; Dð Þ and standard deviation,
population density and techno-social connectivity via talkspan. Although not detailed
Figure 3 Sample HDD run.
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game interactions in addition to strategies that can be randomized individually or in
combinations to isolate dynamics in any specific subcomponent module.
Monitors and plots include time series and dynamic phase portraits for the societal
average of Y, RS, SE and D trajectories and dynamic histograms across all attributes.
This allows us to trace the development of wealth, income inequality, cultural disposi-
tions, and political polarization. We also track the number of transactions games, the
percentage of population interacting, and the number of different cooperative, mixed,
or non-cooperative strategy pairs under different macro environmental conditions.
Before turning to our sensitivity results, we detail our notional run. Here a lesser de-
veloped society, with a mean low income level but high degree of inequality, escapes
the poverty trap through high growth and increasingly moderating democratic institu-
tions. Individual productivity and wealth, driven by successful CC and DC/CD strategy
outcomes of individual transactions, help accelerate the emergence of modern secular
RS and expressive SE norms and values, while democratic D preferences solidify, but
are not engrained throughout all of society. Figure 4 depicts spatial details from the
above simulation at t =0, 150, 300 and 450 snapshots. Initially, we find our low devel-
oped society with high income inequality and polarization along autocratic and demo-
cratic preferences. By t=150, agents quickly increase in individual wealth as several
economic transaction games are played between individuals of similar R and S prefer-
ences while the strategy history shows not one dominant strategy emerges as society
goes through a high growth phase of development. By t=300, we see continued hetero-
geneously mixed populations in terms of income and democratic preferences, while by
t=400 we see increased convergence toward democratic preferences. Although just one
particular simulation, what is critical is that co-evolutionary behavior results in path de-
pendence of economic and cultural change as well as being a key determinant for de-
velopment outcomes. Moreover, changes towards democratic values leads to increasing
cooperative strategy pairs over time.Sensitivity analysis
In order to make more generalizable model inferences, Table 1 details the interactive par-
ameter effects on economic prosperity Y, as well as strategy choice pairs CC, CD/DC and
t = 0 t = 150
t = 300 t = 450
Figure 4 Spatial outcomes at t = 0, 150, 300 and 450.
Table 1 Impact on economic development and strategy pairs
Model Economic CC CD DD
Economic 0.3846* 0.2467* 0.1032*
(0.0019) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Rational secular 0.3298* −0.2756* 0.0598* 0.0643*
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0021)
Self expressive 0.1488* 0.2139* −0.0120* −0.1571*
(0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Democratic 0.1161* 0.0623* −0.0790* −0.0337*
(0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Cooperate 0.1606*
(0.0006)
Defect 0.1088*
(0.0011)
Talk-span 0.1615* 0.5484* 0.3024* 0.1306*
(0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Time 0.0558* 0.1742* −0.2414* −0.1958*
(0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0007)
Constant 0.1972* −0.2481* 0.0028 0.1353*
(0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0016)
# of obs 634459 634459 634459 634459
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R-squared 0.6441 0.6468 0.5171 0.3442
Root MSE 0.1285 0.2081 0.1500 0.1291
Numbers in parentheses are corresponding robust standard errors.
* Significance at 1% level.
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randomly down sample to approximately 634,000 for pooled OLS tractability. As all vari-
ables are relatively scaled, we can interpret magnitude and substantive effects across OLS
β coefficients.
Our first model on economic development Y confirms HD theory that positive values
of mean societal RS, SE and D values do significantly speed the pace of economic devel-
opment, with RS providing the most substantive effect (β = .3298). Looking at the im-
pact of evolutionary games, we see the number agents both choosing cooperation has a
stronger positive impact (β = .1606) than defection (β = .1088) in increasing societal
economic value. This suggests that cooperation does pay higher social dividends on
average. Talkspan spatial proximity is positive and significant (β = .1615), confirming
priors that increasing technology and compressing potential social space also speed de-
velopment processes. Time is also slightly positive (β = .0558), indicating that economic
prosperity is quasi self-reinforcing and path dependent. Model fit (R2=.6441) is accept-
able given the highly complex and non-linear dynamics and pooled nature of sensitivity
analysis data.
Next we explore the potential for co-evolutionary behavior across micro and macro-
scopic scales. Turning to HDD parameter effects on heterogeneously mixed evolution-
ary games, we first focus on the conditions associated with CC strategy pairs - number
of agent interactions where both i and j chose to cooperate. Talkspan is the most sub-
stantial (β = .5484), indicating increasing individual agents’ ability to reach other like-
minded agents spurs cooperation dramatically based on first order local interactions.
Not surprisingly, economic progress Y (β = .3846) and self-expression SE (β = .2139)
are also influential on increasing cooperative societal transactions showing coupled and
cascading emergence at increased scale. Unexpectedly, secular values RS (β = −.2756)
significantly decrease societal cooperation but still exhibit strong co-evolution, perhaps
supplanting contract enforcement in traditional societies. Time is significantly positive
(β = .1742), showing how cooperation tends to evolve over time with path dependence.
This is especially interesting in light of RS’s positive impact on growth. This suggests
that non-Pareto, asymmetric payoffs might be a necessary condition for development,
regardless of path dependency. Model fit (R2=.6468) is acceptable.
Looking at the number of agent interactions where either i or j cooperates when
the other defects (CD or DC), we find strong co-evolution but with the different ef-
fects. While talkspan still dominates locally (β = .3024) and the economic environ-
ment (β = .2467) influences the nature of strategic interactions, there is less relative
impact in driving asymmetric agent strategies. Consistently, increasing secular values
SE (β = .0598) slightly contributes to asymmetric strategic behavior while increasing
democratic norms D (β = −.0790) and expressive RS behavior (β = −.0120) curtails
such unilateral advantages. More importantly, time (β = −.2414) is highly negatively re-
lated to asymmetric payoffs. Under asymmetry, agents cannot sustain such transaction
outcomes as economic gains motivate preferences to become more closely aligned. Model
fit (R2=.5171) is also acceptable.
Finally, focusing on the number of agent interactions where both i and j chose de-
fection (DD), we find self expressive SE behavior (β = −.1571) and time (β = −.1958)
have the largest impact in dampening asymmetric payoffs in societal transactions.
Democratic institutions D (β = −.0790) also still deter such behavior. Talk span
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strategy pairs but surprisingly at much lower levels than either in CD/DC or CC
transactions. Expanding the feasible spatial set and individual’s wealth does increase
the temptation to defect for both agents. It also raises the immediacy of first order ef-
fects. Model fit (R2=.3442) is relatively poor on DD strategy pairs compared to our
other results, suggesting more complex processes need further exploration to increase
result confidence.Discussion
Figure 5 depicts a panel of average run trajectories across sampled parameter space.
Here we focus on the interactive effects of low, medium and high mean self expressive
SE ¼ :05; :5; :95ð Þ behavior plots across societies with differing low, medium and high
mean democratic norms D ¼ :05; :5; :95ð Þ given various levels of economic develop-
ment and mutually cooperative (CC) behavior. Each line represents the average
iteration value between t= 0 to 700 of our 40,000 runs. Low, middle and high mean de-
veloped Y ¼ :05; :5; :95ð Þ societies trajectories are in blue, orange and green respect-
ively. Regardless of initial macro social conditions and consistent with neoclassical
economic growth theories, we see both sigma income levels and beta growth rates con-
ditional convergence with similar trajectory slopes and phase shifts. We also findFigure 5 Path dependency of 40,000 average run trajectories across sampled parameter space.
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ment of social co-evolution. However, focusing on highly developed societies (in green)
across all plots, we see on average, intra-societal cooperative transactions emerge faster
than for low income societies (in blue). This does not occur necessarily at higher devel-
opment levels as our previous results suggest income growth, not levels, is a key driver
of CC strategy pairs. Looking across initial democratic societal conditions, development
outcomes and cooperative norms are most varied in low SE societies and tend to
homogenize as individual and societal expressive culture increases. More interestingly,
democratic institutions actually provide the largest impetus, fostering more cooperation
and increasing growth in low and middle-income societies. These effects are both time
and path dependent as they diminish in highly expressive, democratic societies where
economic factors once again become the key determinant.Conclusions
Consistent with qualitative HD theory and empirical reality, our HDD model finds
complexity and nonlinear path dependence in three areas: adaptive development pro-
cesses, social co-evolutionary transactions and near equilibrium development trajec-
tories. From a complex adaptive system perspective on HD theoretical processes,
economic progress is a necessary condition for successful secularization and expressive
political behavior, which are antecedents for lasting democratic institutions. While
modernization is not inevitable, our results support empirical observations for a staged
process where increasing existential security via economic development leads to in-
creased emphasis on rational-secular and self-expressive values that results in societal
development. Here we find that rational-secular norms strongly impact economic
growth and speed up the pace of development more than self-expressive societal
values alone. Beyond supporting HD theory, agents do adapt interactively with their
environments as mutual cooperation does result in higher societal wealth than defec-
tion alone and is self reinforcing over time.
Exploring the impact of societal conditions on transactions, in CC strategy pairs,
compressing techno-social space by increased spatial proximity promotes co-evolutionary
entrainment and mutual cooperation. Surprisingly, high secular values actually dampen
CC outcomes suggesting the necessary role of asymmetric, Nash dominant strategies as
one potential engine of high growth during industrialization phases. For CD/DC strategy
pairs, we find consistently similar factors but with converse impacts. More interestingly,
increasing macroscopic secular values over time has a dampening effect on individual
non-Pareto outcomes. Higher macroscopic societal wealth and expanded social connectiv-
ity also dampen DD outcomes initially.
Turning to the path dependence of development trajectories, our results are consist-
ent with neo-classical growth income convergence and the evolution of cooperation
(Axelrod 1987, 1997a). We find convergence despite various initial income levels, in-
equality, social and cultural conditions on both sigma levels and beta growth rates
while cooperation emerges over time. Social co-evolution of Pareto outcomes as seen
by CC strategy pairs, tends to materialize faster in low income countries then dissipate
in high growth, middle income societies only to return towards more predominately
Pareto transaction outcomes in high income societies. One possible explanation is that
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high growth, emerging market economies. Epistatic Pareto outcomes and resulting
wealth creation are most varied in low self-expressive societies, consistent with charac-
terizations of a poverty trap (Sachs 2005). Democratic norms and institutions are a key
driver, providing the largest impact in fostering cooperation and speeding economic
growth in low and middle income societies. However, we find diminishing returns to
democratization’s benefits in advanced, highly expressive and already democratic soci-
eties, when economics once again takes primacy.
As economic activity pushes into the quaternary phase of development, we can only
begin to ponder potential implications. Transitioning knowledge based services, and
the multiplier impact that technology has on culture, politics and human development,
only accelerates discontinuous change. Such forces are likely to produce new positive
feedbacks across previously disparate and isolated domains, amplifying the coupling of
technology, culture and society, to induce far-from-equilibrium conditions that will sur-
prise us the most. Punctuated equilibria changes are the norm, not the exception, to
modern human history − spanning the rise of the nation state, industrialization, access
to mass transportation, the internet and most recently the social media revolution.
Given the strategic, adaptive nature of human beings, we can only speculate as to new
possible streams of norms, institutions and organizational complexity with subsequent,
catastrophic system order shifts and dynamics that might emerge.
Our next research step is to thoroughly empirically verify the entire HDD model with
upcoming available WVS data. Once validated, a natural extension is to specifically in-
corporate agent memory and learning following Quek et al. (2009) and multi-player PD
from evolutionary game theory to map the complex transaction networks that emerge
over time. Another is to tackle far-from-equilibrium challenges by exploring the full dy-
namic characteristics of both societal systems and individuals. Key will be identifying
behavioral symmetry breaks and formally testing for catastrophic or chaotic responses
(Wolf et al. 1985) to economic, cultural, social and political crisis (Abdollahian and
Kang 2008), coupling or decoupling. One approach is to endogenize perturbations and
shocks across Y, RS, SE and D values and agent space, to map equilibrium stability and
system phase transitions. As domain linkages couple and morph, differential patterns of
individual behavioral and system response can be identified through multiple local and
global solution trajectories. This can allow us to parameterize the entire HDD macro–
micro model to explicitly test for fold, cusp, swallowtail and higher order catastrophic
(Çambel 1993) or chaotic, observed system behavior via Lyapunov exponents (Pecora
and Carroll 1990), driven by micro-level interactions.
While only an initial, rough approximation at the truly complex, interdependent and
highly nonlinear nature of modernization, our HDD approach provides insights into
the interactivity of individual agency and societal outcomes seen through the lens of
evolutionary games. While high risk for implementing properly, the knowledge rewards
from fusing more detailed and leading theories from economics, cultural studies, soci-
ology and political science via complex adaptive systems methods can be substantial.
We hope such work motivates others to extend potential inquiries and insights with
even greater theoretical fidelity and empirical resolution. Perhaps techno-social simula-
tions like HDD can assist policy makers and scholar alike, to better understand, antici-
pate and shape positive social outcomes for all.
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